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A B S T R A C T 
Dynamic tariﬀs have the potential to contribute to a successful shift from conventional to renewable 
energies, but tapping this potential in Europe ultimately depends on residential consumers selecting 
them. This study proposes and finds that consumer reactions to dynamic tariﬀs depend on the level 
of perceived price complexity that represents the cognitive eﬀort consumers must engage in to 
compute the overall bill amount. An online experiment conducted with a representative sample of 
664 German residential energy consumers examines how salient characteristics of dynamic tariﬀs 
contribute to perceived price complexity. Subsequently, a structural equation model (SEM) reveals 
that the depth of information processing is central to understand how price complexity relates to 
consumers’ behavioral intentions. The results suggest that it will be challenging to convince 
European consumers to select complex dynamic tariﬀs under the current legal framework. 
Policymakers will need to find ways to make these tariﬀs more attractive. 
1. Introduction  
In response to climate change, many national governments have started to shift electricity 
generation from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources (RES) or nuclear power (EC, 2010; Mills and 
Schleich, 2012). These eﬀorts have been reinforced by the 2015 United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in Paris at which large parts of the world implicitly committed to nearly carbon-free 
electricity generation by the middle of this century. However, the euphoria about this remarkable 
multilateral achievement cannot hide the fact that decarbonization of the electricity system is and 
will continue to be a challenging endeavor for energy providers, policymakers, and society as a 
whole. 
The feed-in of RES-based technologies occurs mainly on decentralized grid levels and, in the case of 
photovoltaic and wind, the controllability of feed-in is limited to the largely ineﬃcient curtailment 
(Loisel et al., 2010). Hence, if no unexpected leaps in storage technologies and electricity exchange 
with neighboring countries occur, decarbonization processes will rely on increased demand-side 
flexibil-ity (Breukers et al., 2011; Grünewald et al., 2015). One promising way to achieve this 
flexibility at relatively low cost is by means of dynamic tariﬀs (Grünewald et al., 2015; Roscoe and 
Ault, 2010). In dynamic tariﬀ schemes, residential consumers pay diﬀerent prices per kWh, 
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depending on the time of use and/or on the current load at household level (Dütschke and Paetz, 
2013). In contrast, static tariﬀs consist of a fixed connection charge per time period and one 
consumption-depen-dent charge per kWh, resulting in peak demand being relatively underpriced 
(Hall et al., 2016; Simshauser and Downer, 2014). The idea is that dynamic tariﬀs financially 
incentivize consumers to react to the status of the electricity system by shifting consumption from 
peak to non-peak periods of the residual load, hereby supporting the integration of RES (Darby and 
Pisica, 2013; Dupont et al., 2014; Grünewald et al., 2015). Data from field tests conducted mainly in 
the US confirm that dynamic tariﬀs can lead to substantial peak load reductions (e.g., Faruqui and 
Sergici, 2010). 
Given this evident potential, European politics and lawmakers are generally supportive of dynamic 
electricity tariﬀs. For example, German law requires power suppliers to oﬀer at least one dynamic 
tariﬀ (EnWG §40), and the European Commission strongly recommends their application (EC, 
COM(2015) 339 final). The key diﬀerence to the US legislation is that in most European countries 
dynamic tariﬀs are not provided by default but only as an opt-in option (Faruqui et al., 2010). Unlike 
in the US, the potential of dynamic tariﬀs to contribute to a successful decarbonization in Europe 
ultimately depends on residential consumers selecting them (Salies, 2013). 
Unfortunately, the prior literature on demand side management (DSM) suggests that consumers 
show adverse reactions to the inherent complexity of dynamic tariﬀs (e.g., Breukers and Mourik, 
2013; Dütschke and Paetz, 2013; Gordon et al., 2006; Stenner et al., 2015). For example, Dütschke 
and Paetz (2013) note that “consumers are open to dynamic prices, but prefer simple programs to 
complex and highly dynamic ones” (p. 226). In a similar vein, Dupont et al. (2014) stress the 
importance of “social acceptability” and conclude that “a tariﬀ should be simple” (p. 346). While 
there is apparently consensus on this general notion, very little is known about the underlying 
process by which consumers evaluate dynamic tariﬀs, and the role complexity plays in it. A profound 
understanding of these processes is crucial to design dynamic tariﬀs that overcome the conflict 
between supply-demand balancing and consumer acceptance. 
The overarching goal of this study is to close this research gap and to examine antecedents and 
consequences of consumers’ perceived price complexity of dynamic tariﬀs. To do so, we draw on 
research in the domains of marketing, especially behavioral pricing, and psychology. In line with 
Homburg et al. (2014), we define price complexity as the extent to which a price or tariﬀ2 poses a 
high cognitive burden on the consumer in his/her eﬀort to make sense of the price components and 
to mathematically arrive at the final bill amount. The term “cognitive burden” has a negative valence, 
reflecting the common conception that consumers are cognitive misers who naturally avoid their 
limited information-processing resources to be exploited (Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Miller, 1956). 
Based on our conceptualization, all prices that consumers are confronted with are perceived as 
complex to a certain degree. Most prices in everyday shopping situations (e.g., for consumer goods) 
have low levels of inherent complexity because they involve one single number and, at most, an 
additional discount to take into account. However, we expect dynamic tariﬀs to be perceived as 
relatively complex by nature because determining the correct bill amount requires consumers to 
apply diﬀerent mathematical operations, for example, multiplying consumption-dependent price 
                                                          
2 We use the terms price and tariﬀ interchangeably throughout this article. 
 
Postprint of article “Perceived price complexity of dynamic energy tariffs: An investigation of 
antecedents and consequences” in Energy policy, 106, 244-254. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2017.02.051  
 
3 
 
components with anticipated consumption, adding the resulting values together, etc. (Homburg et 
al., 2014). All these operations should contribute to a relatively high cognitive burden and hence 
perceived price complexity. 
The pricing literature supports the initial findings in the realm of DSM regarding consumer reactions 
to complex tariﬀs. For example, in an influential article, Lambrecht and Skiera (2006) examine tariﬀs 
of internet service providers and find evidence that many consumers choose flat-rate tariﬀs over 
pay-per-use tariﬀs even if the pay-per-use tariﬀ is economically favorable. In fact, in service industry 
practice, there is a trend toward simple flat-rate tariﬀs (e.g., for mobile phone, internet or health 
club services) in which no mathematical operations are necessary. As dynamic tariﬀs imply the exact 
opposite, it is critical to examine the level of price complexity that consumers associate with salient 
aspects of dynamic tariﬀs. A review of actual tariﬀs suggests that dynamic tariﬀs not only have 
varying numbers of price components, but they also typically include a discount for new customers 
and frequently use odd numbers that are more diﬃcult to process. This leads to the first research 
question: 
RQ1: To what extent do these characteristics of dynamic tariﬀs lead to perceived price complexity? 
Furthermore, our research seeks to illuminate the process by which perceived price complexity leads 
to behavioral reactions. We start with the observation that, from a consumer standpoint, energy 
represents a domain that is highly relevant for every household but typically evokes only little 
consumer awareness or involvement (Fischer, 2008; Hargreaves et al., 2010). In this context, 
consumers likely not only diﬀer in their cognitive ability but also in their motivation to engage in the 
cognitive eﬀort that a high price complexity implies. To the best of our knowledge, prior research on 
price complexity has neglected the focal context. The absence of motivation and/or ability typically 
decreases the depth of information processing, that is, consumers base the tariﬀ evaluation on 
simple heuristics (e.g., Chaiken et al., 1989; Haugtvedt et al., 1992). Prior pricing research suggests 
that relying on heuristics can substantially distort consumer price evaluations (Morwitz et al., 1998), 
but research in the realm of dynamic electricity tariﬀs is lacking. This leads to our second research 
question: 
RQ2: (a) How does perceived price complexity aﬀect the depth of information processing, and (b) 
how does the depth of information processing in turn aﬀect behavioral intentions to select a dynamic 
tariﬀ? 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief review of 
the literature on consumer reactions to dynamic energy tariﬀs and the role of dynamic tariﬀs for 
DSM. Subsequently, we develop our conceptual model and hypotheses. It is a process model 
covering antecedents and consequences of perceived price complexity. Sections 4 and 5 provide an 
outline of our method and analytic procedure, as well as the results and a discussion. Finally, we 
elaborate on contributions and implications and provide avenues for further research. 
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2. Literature review 
As discussed in prior research (e.g., Dütschke and Paetz, 2013; Faruqui et al., 2010), the literature on 
dynamic tariﬀs distinguishes three major types of dynamic tariﬀs: time-of-use (TOU), critical peak 
pricing (CPP), and real time pricing (RTP). TOU tariﬀs are considered the least dynamic of the dynamic 
tariﬀs. They usually consist of a connection charge and consumption-dependent charges under a 
fixed timetable for a long period. CPP tariﬀs include extraordinary events or interruptible rates that 
penalize consumers heavily for consumption during critical peak periods. RTP tariﬀs are considered 
the most dynamic with charges following actual market prices. Note that diﬀerent combinations of 
these characteristics are possible (e.g., Dütschke and Paetz, 2013; Fell et al., 2015). 
Research on these dynamic tariﬀs can be ascribed to two major research streams: (1) research on the 
eﬀectiveness of dynamic tariﬀs as a strategy to reduce peak demand in the realm of DSM, and (2) 
research on consumer acceptance of dynamic tariﬀs. Regarding the former, research seeks to 
illuminate which, and to what extent, tariﬀs are eﬀective in reducing peak demand. Whereas initial 
research finds that price elasticity is “fairly low” for private consumers (Lijesen, 2007, p. 249), a 
diﬀerent conclusion can be drawn from more recent research that accounts for diﬀerent tariﬀs and 
circumstances (for comprehen-sive overviews see Faruqui and Sergici, 2010; Newsham and Bowker, 
2010; Quillinan, 2011). For example, Newsham and Bowker (2010) highlight the eﬃcacy of such 
tariﬀs in pilots and conclude that reasonable expectations for peak load reductions are 5% for TOU 
tariﬀs and at least 30% for CPP tariﬀs. As Quillinan (2011) notes, it seems not so much the question 
whether dynamic tariﬀs are eﬀective, but how managers can overcome the challenges that relate to 
market-ing these tariﬀs to consumers. 
In line with this notion, the second stream of research takes on a more consumer-oriented stance. In 
an influential article, Faruqui et al. (2010) point to the huge savings potential from smart meters in 
the EU if only barriers to consumers adopting dynamic tariﬀs can be over-come. In response, an 
increasing number of articles investigate consumer acceptance of dynamic tariﬀs. Notably, most 
evidence stems from focus groups, attitudinal surveys and pilots (Quillinan, 2011). For instance, 
Paetz et al. (2012) conduct focus group interviews indicating that consumers who recognize the 
importance of dynamic tariﬀs are willing to “consider” (p. 32) dynamic tariﬀs in the near future in 
order to save money, conserve electricity, and contribute to environmental benefits. However, more 
recent research finds that consumers are put oﬀ by the inherent complexity of highly dynamic tariﬀ 
types. Dütschke and Paetz (2013) conduct a conjoint analysis and find that consumers prefer TOU to 
RTP tariﬀs. Darby and Pisica (2013) analyze material from six focus group and find that more simple 
tariﬀs are preferred. Stenner et al. (2015) conduct a large-scale experimental study with an 
Australian sample and find that consumers prefer the flat rate tariﬀ to all other tariﬀs and simpler 
tariﬀs seem to be more attractive. Whereas consumers with higher education or renters are more 
likely to choose a dynamic tariﬀ in general, CPP is most attractive for people in lower income classes. 
An important reason for the preference for simple tariﬀs is that a higher complexity implies a higher 
perceived risk (Darby and Pisica, 2013; Dütschke and Paetz, 2013; Stenner et al., 2015). This notion is 
in line with Fell et al. (2015) who find that trust in the electricity supplier positively increases the 
attractiveness of dynamic tariﬀs, whereas privacy concerns show the opposite influence. Our study 
takes a diﬀerent approach and focuses directly on the construct of perceived price complexity. 
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Figure 1 Conceptual model and analytic procedure. 
 
3. Development of conceptual model and hypotheses 
Fig. 1 presents our conceptual framework and the analytic steps by which we go forward. To 
motivate our conceptual model, we draw on the behavioral pricing literature that contributes to our 
understanding of consumer evaluations and reactions to diﬀerent pricing tactics such as price 
partitioning (e.g., Morwitz et al., 1998; Greenleaf et al., 2016) multi-part tariﬀs (e.g., Lambrecht and 
Skiera, 2006; Schlereth and Skiera, 2012), and multi-dimensional prices (e.g., Estelami, 1999, 2003), 
as well as on the social psychology literature on the three primary aspects of thinking (Petty et al., 
2002). 
3.1. Drivers of perceived price complexity 
Based on an online examination of actual electricity tariﬀs oﬀered in Germany, we expect that the 
complexity of an electricity tariﬀ will be driven by the following antecedents: (1) the tariﬀ type as it 
determines the number of price components above and beyond the connection charge, (2) the price 
ending of the respective consumption-dependent price components, and the (3) presentation format 
of the discount oﬀered to new customers selecting the tariﬀ. All these aspects contribute to more 
diﬃcult and cognitively demanding information processing (Estelami, 1999, 2003; Homburg et al., 
2014). It can be argued that these antecedents represent an objective form of price complexity that 
consumers translate in a subjective, perceived price complexity. 
Regarding tariﬀ type, we distinguish TOU (i.e., one consumption-dependent price component), CPP 
with an extra rate for the annual hours with maximal load (i.e., two consumption-dependent price 
component), and RTP where electricity rates alter on an hourly basis (in our study, designed as a 
dynamic tariﬀ with three consumption-dependent price components). Hence, to evaluate these 
dynamic tariﬀs, consumers need to multiply each consumption-dependent price component with an 
anticipated consumption per time period, add the resulting numbers and the connection charge 
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together3. The more consumption-dependent price components are involved, the higher the 
cognitive eﬀort. Prior research suggests that the number of price components is an important factor 
in price evaluations (Carlson and Weathers, 2008; Feurer et al., 2015; Homburg et al., 2014). 
Regarding the price ending of the respective consumption-dependent price components, prior 
research shows that odd price endings are more diﬃcult to process than even price endings (Choi et 
al., 2014; Estelami, 1999). Regarding the presentation format of the discount oﬀered to new 
customers selecting the tariﬀ, the cognitive eﬀort should be higher for a discount that is presented as 
a percentage of the connection charge (vs. an absolute number) because multiplying is more diﬃcult 
than subtracting (Estelami, 1999). Taken together, we hypothesize: 
 
H1: Tariﬀ type has a direct eﬀect on perceived price complexity such that the higher the number of 
consumption-dependent price components the tariﬀ comprises, the higher the perceived price 
complexity. 
H2: Odd price endings of the consumption-dependent price components of a dynamic tariﬀ lead to 
higher perceived price complexity than even price endings. 
H3: If the discount of a dynamic tariﬀ is presented as a percentage, the perceived price complexity is 
higher than when it is presented as an absolute number. 
 
As our conceptualization of perceived price complexity is based on the notion of cognitive load, we 
must acknowledge prior research suggesting that individuals diﬀer not only in their ability but also in 
their opportunity and motivation to process complex information (MacInnis et al., 1991). Specifically, 
need for cognition (NFC) refers to a stable dispositional diﬀerence in cognitive motivation that is 
distinguishable from (but related to) intellectual ability (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982). High-NFC 
consumers have “active, exploring minds and, through their senses and intellect, reach and draw out 
information from their environment” (Cacioppo et al., 1996, p. 199). Hence, high-NFC consumers 
enjoy facing complex situations while low-NFC con-sumers are cognitive misers who lack intrinsic 
cognitive motivation and are thus more likely to avoid cognitively strenuous work (Goodman and 
Irmak, 2013). Consequently, we expect that high (low) NFC individuals are capable of processing 
more (less) complex tariﬀ information before experiencing cognitive overload and hence perceived 
price complexity. We hypothesize: 
H4: NFC moderates the eﬀects proposed in such that the eﬀects are weaker (stronger) for individuals 
high (vs. low) in NFC. 
 
 
                                                          
3 It can be argued that this exercise is further complicated by the fact that consumers would require detailed 
knowledge of the household's load curve. We thank an anonymous reviewer for noting this. 
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3.2. Consequences of perceived price complexity 
Prior research suggests that perceived price complexity may have several adverse consequences, 
including reduced perceived transparency of the firm's pricing and reduced price fairness (Carlson 
and Weathers, 2008; Homburg et al., 2014; Feurer et al., 2015). For the present study, we propose 
that three variables play a central (i.e., mediating) role, linking perceived price complexity to 
behavioral intentions: (1) the extent of heuristic processing, (2) perceived bill amount, and (3) 
thought confidence. These three variables relate to diﬀerent aspects of thinking about an issue that 
leads to attitude formation and, ultimately, behavior. 
According to Petty et al. (2002), the social psychology literature emphasizes three primary aspects of 
thinking. We incorporate each of these aspects on thinking about a tariﬀ in our model. The first 
aspect is the extent of thinking, which we capture by the depth of information processing. We 
conceptualize this variable to represent a continuum reaching from heuristic (“shallow”) processing 
to systematic (“deep”) processing (Chaiken, 1980). If the information processing is systematic, 
individuals exert considerable cognitive eﬀort to perform the evaluation task. If the information 
processing is heuristic, individuals exert little cognitive eﬀort in evaluating a tariﬀ but apply heuristics 
which “are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors” (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974, p. 1124). 
The second aspect of thinking is content, relating to how favorable or unfavorable the thoughts are 
in response to the thought object. We capture this aspect by the perceived bill amount, which we 
define as the subjective monetary burden of a tariﬀ. The inclusion of this variable is important 
because consumers do not always know, encode or estimate an objective price correctly (Carlson and 
Weathers, 2008; Zeithaml, 1988). 
The third aspect of thinking we capture is thought confidence. Thought confidence reflects a more 
meta-cognitive aspect of thinking that relates to an individual's thoughts about his or her own 
thought processes (Jost et al., 1998; Petty et al., 2002). In line with prior research by Goode et al. 
(2013) and Petty et al. (2002), we define thought confidence as the extent to which a person has 
confidence in their thoughts related to the evaluation of the tariﬀ. 
We expect that perceived price complexity has an eﬀect on all three aspects of consumers’ thinking 
about a dynamic tariﬀ. First, perceived price complexity may determine whether consumers engage 
in systematic or heuristic processing. If the perceived price complexity exceeds the consumer's 
processing limit, information overload may occur, representing an uncomfortable situation (Grisé 
and Gallupe, 1999). As a result, consumers may reduce this cognitive load by applying heuristic 
processing (Malhotra, 1982; Miller, 1956). When this happens, the consumer will not be able or 
motivated to calculate the final billing amount. Instead, she or he will be more likely to rely on a 
rough estimate of the costs involved in selecting the respective tariﬀ. Indeed, Morwitz et al. (1998) 
provide evidence that consumers apply simple anchoring heuristics when evaluating partitioned 
prices. In contrast, if the perceived price complexity and consequently information load is low, 
consumers are more likely to take all of this information into account within an evaluation task and 
attempt to calculate the final bill amount (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Shiﬀrin and Schneider, 1977). 
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H5: Perceived price complexity of a dynamic tariﬀ is negatively related to the depth of information 
processing. 
 
Prior research indicates that the application of heuristics plays a central role in consumers’ price 
judgments (Alba et al., 1999; Morwitz et al., 1998). Hence, we propose that the depth of information 
processing has an impact on the perceived bill amount. For instance, Morwitz et al. (1998) argue that 
for partitioned prices consumers focus on the base price but insuﬃciently adjust for the surcharges. 
Another heuristic used when evaluating prices is the left-digit eﬀect, predicting that consumers focus 
on the left-most digit of the price and ignore the ones that follow, also leading to an underestimation 
(Thomas et al., 2010). In contrast, Carlson and Weathers (2008) observe that for price partitioning 
with a large number of price components, consumers overestimated the total price. As their study 
design is closest to the complexity inherent in dynamic energy tariﬀs, we expect that heuristic 
(systematic) processing leads to an overestimation (underestimation) of the perceived bill amount. 
Thus: 
 
H6a: Depth of information processing is negatively related to the perceived bill amount. 
 
The depth of information processing itself may also influence consumers’ thought confidence. We 
expect that a high depth of information processing (i.e., systematic processing) increases thought 
confidence because consumers are aware that all relevant and potentially important price 
information have been incorporated in the tariﬀ evaluation. Reversely, if the depth of information 
processing is low (i.e., heuristic processing), a consumer may lose faith in his or her own ability to 
evaluate the tariﬀ in an adequate manner (cf. Jacowitz and Kahneman, 1995). In fact, a consumer 
may not even be able to name or recognize the heuristic she or he applies to evaluate the electricity 
tariﬀ but still be aware of the fact that heuristic information processing is activated (Chen and 
Chaiken, 1999). Hence: 
 
H6b: Depth of information processing is positively related to thought confidence. 
 
The last two hypotheses are rather straightforward. In what is a common consensus in the literature, 
the subjective price is negatively related to perceived value and ultimately behavior (e.g., Bornemann 
and Homburg, 2011; Zeithaml, 1988). 
Furthermore, we expect that thought confidence has a positive eﬀect on behavioral intentions (cf. 
Bennett and Harrell (1975)). This notion is in line with Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive 
dissonance. If a consumer has low thought confidence in his or her own tariﬀ evaluation, he or she is 
expected to seek to reduce dissonance by leaving the exchange relationship, defer choice or produce 
a less favorable evaluation, all of which relate to lower behavioral intentions. Similarly, low levels of 
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thought confidence imply a certain degree of uncertainty, reducing behavioral intentions (cf. Goode 
et al., 2013; Mitchell, 1999). Hence: 
H7: The perceived costs of a tariﬀ have a negative eﬀect on behavioral intentions. 
H8: The confidence towards the tariﬀ evaluation has a positive eﬀect on behavioral intentions. 
 
4. Method 
4.1. Sample 
We used a commercial consumer panel to recruit a representative sample of German consumers to 
participate in an online experiment. A total of 1048 completed questionnaires were obtained. In a 
first step, to ensure that all participants read and understood the scenario and the following 
questions well, we excluded 246 participants for obvious speeding and for pausing more than six 
minutes after reading the scenario. In a second step, we excluded 138 participants for suspicious 
answering patterns. The resulting eﬀective sample size is 664. The sample is representative of the 
German population in terms of gender, age, education and income. Table 1 provides a summary of 
the sample composition. 
Table 1 
 
Sample Composition.  
 
Characteristic Representative Effective sample 
 distribution distribution 
    
Gender    
Male 49% 51% (341) 
Female 51% 49% (323) 
Age    
18–24 years 10% 8%      (50) 
25–34 years 14% 12% (82) 
35–44 years 19% 19% (123) 
45–54 years 18% 20% (136) 
55–64 years 14% 17% (115) 
65+ years 24% 24% (158) 
Education    
Low 42% 32% (213) 
Medium 29% 33% (220) 
High 28% 35% (231) 
Monthly net income    
Below 1300 Euro 20% 20% (129) 
1300 – 2599 Euro 33% 35% (232) 
2600 – 3599 Euro 18% 18% (122) 
3600 – 4999 Euro 15% 17% (113) 
5000 Euro or more 13% 10% (68)  
 
Education was queried throughout seven categories and has been clustered to the three characteristics of low, 
medium and high. Low education includes subjects with secondary modern school qualification or without 
school qualification. Medium education includes subjects with secondary school leaving certificate or 
vocational school qualification. High education includes any kind of university degree as well as high-school 
diploma. 
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4.2. Experimental design and procedure 
Participants were randomly allocated to the 16 treatment conditions of a 4 (Tariﬀ type: standard vs. 
TOU vs. CPP vs. RTP) x 2 (Price endings of consumption-dependent price components: odd vs. even) x 
2 (discount presentation format: percent vs. absolute) full-factorial between-subjects design. Note 
that the tariﬀ type corresponds to the number of consumption-dependent price components over 
and above the monthly connection charge (standard = 1 consumption-dependent price components, 
TOU = 2 pay-per use components, CPP = 3 consumption-dependent price components, and RTP = 4 
consumption-dependent price components). In our experimental setup, the TOU tariﬀ comprises two 
price components for diﬀerent times of day. The CPP tariﬀ includes a price component that is 
activated in the 100 hours with highest load occurring, and the RTP tariﬀ additionally includes a price 
component that is activated in the 100 hours with highest solar radiation occurring. Table 2 presents 
the stimuli used in our study. 
The participants were asked to imagine that they moved to a diﬀerent city and were now to select an 
energy tariﬀ as a new customer. Subsequently, consumers were presented one of the manipulated 
tariﬀs from a fictional supplier together with an artificial consumption pattern. The supplier name 
was fictional to avoid reputation influences of the provider (Homburg et al., 2014). The artificial 
consumption pattern was necessary to enable consumers to calculate the final billing amount and at 
the same time control for inter-participant variance in consumption. The artificial consumption 
pattern (see Table 3) was designed such that in all experimental conditions, based on the average 
German household consumption of 3500 kWh, the bill amount added up to about €962 per year. 
Note that this total amount varies slightly across conditions due to our eﬀorts to construct 
indisputable manipulations of our experimental variables. Still, we argue that all results that will be 
presented in later sections of this article can be attributed to consumer perceptions of price 
complexity rather than to diﬀerences in the monetary sacrifice of electricity consumption. 
 
4.3. Measurement 
Following the presentation of the scenario and the tariﬀ, participants went on to respond to a 
questionnaire that included the focal variables. All latent constructs were measured on seven-point 
Likert scales or semantic diﬀerentials, using items derived from prior publications in top-tier 
marketing journals. The items were translated into German and adapted to the focal context. 
Additionally, perceived bill amount was measured on a single-item scale, asking participants to 
indicate the overall bill amount per year. Table 4 provides a summary of the measurement and 
psychometric properties. All multi-item scales were found to be unidimensional and to show high 
convergent validity (see Table 4) and discriminant validity on the Fornell and Larcker (1981) criterion 
(see Table 5). 
The full survey is available as Supplementary online material. 
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5. Results 
5.1. Analysis of antecedents of perceived price complexity 
5.1.1. Findings 
 
We analyzed the data using SPSS 23. We started with manipulation checks for the respective 
predictors. In the questionnaire, respondents answered the question (“How many diﬀerent price 
components per kWh did the tariﬀ comprise depending on the time of consumption?”) on a scale 
anchored 1 and 5. Contrast tests between the four respective tariﬀs (Standard, TOU, CPP, RTP) 
indicated that the number of price components was perceived as significantly distinct (MStandard = 2.14 
vs. MTOU = 2.45; t = –2.83, p < .01; MTOU = 2.45 vs. MCPP = 2.96; t = –4.65, p < .01; MCPP = 2.96 vs. MRTP = 
3.23; t = –2.57, p = .01). Thus, the tariﬀ type manipulation was successful. Furthermore, participants 
indicated on a seven-point semantic diﬀerential scale with the anchors 1 = “definitely even” and 7 = 
“definitely odd” that the consumption-dependent price components were perceived as having 
diﬀerent price endings (Meven 3.27 vs. Modd = 5.20; F(1, 662) = 186.20, p < .01). Hence, the price ending 
manipulation was eﬀective in the intended direction. Last, participants indicated on a seven-point 
semantic diﬀerential scale anchored 1 = “definitely absolute” and 7 = “definitely a percentage” that 
the discount was presented in a distinct manner (Mabsolute = 2.30 vs. Mpercent = 5.27; F(1, 662) = 
412.05, p < .01). Hence, the discount presentation format manipulation was successful. 
Prior to further analysis, we split NFC at the median (4.75). Subsequently, we ran a general linear model 
with perceived price complexity as the dependent variable and tariﬀ type, price ending of 
consumption-dependent price components, discount presentation format, and NFC as predictors 
(F(31, 632) = 4.298, p < .001; Adjusted R2 = .134). We found a significant main eﬀect of tariﬀ type (F(3, 
632) = 7.626, p < .001) that generally supports H1, indicating that the perceived price complexity 
increases with more consumption-dependent price components. However, Fig. 2 reveals a somewhat 
more complex pattern. We explored this pattern using the Ryan-Einot-Gabriel-Welch F post hoc test 
to identify homogeneous subsets. The test reveals two distinct subsets (p < .05), the first including 
standard and TOU, and the second including CPP and RTP of which the latter induces a significantly 
higher level of perceived price complexity. 
Second, odd (Modd = 4.38) vs. even (Meven = 4.06) price endings of the consumption-dependent price 
components contribute to a higher perceived price complexity (F (1, 632) = 7.036, p < .01), supporting 
H2. Third, and in support of H3, we observe that the discount presentation formatted as a percentage 
(Mpercent = 4.35) leads to a higher perceived price complexity than formatted as an absolute number 
(Mabsolute = 4.09; F(1, 632) = 4.870, p < .05). Last, albeit not hypothesized, the main eﬀect of NFC 
(F(1, 632) = 4.253, p < .001) was negative and significant, suggesting that individuals high in NFC 
generally have a lower perception of price complexity than their low-NFC counterparts. 
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Table 2 
 
Stimuli.      
      
 Treatment condition Consumption-dependent price Period of occurrence New subscriber 
Connection 
Charge 
  components  discounta  
      
Standard tariﬀ 1 29.00 cents/kWh All-day €133 €80 p.a. 
 2 29.43 cents/kWh All-day €148 €80 p.a. 
 3 29.00 cents/kWh All-day 165%b €80 p.a. 
 4 29.43 cents/kWh All-day 185%b €80 p.a. 
TOU tariﬀ 5 26.00 cents/kWh All-day, except €148 €80 p.a. 
  34.00 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
 6 25.67 cents/kWh All-day, except €148 €80 p.a. 
  34.44 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
 7 26.00 cents/kWh All-day, except 185%b €80 p.a. 
  34.00 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
 8 25.67 cents/kWh All-day, except 185%b €80 p.a. 
  34.44 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
CPP tariﬀ 9 26.00 cents/kWh All-day, except €148 €80 p.a. 
  30.00 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
  90.00 cents/kWh 100 h/ac   
 10 25.67 cents/kWh All-day, except €148 €80 p.a. 
  30.17 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
  94.22 cents/kWh 100 h/ac   
 11 26.00 cents/kWh All-day, except 185%b €80 p.a. 
  30.00 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
  90.00 cents/kWh 100 h/ac   
 12 25.67 cents/kWh All-day, except 185%b €80 p.a. 
  30.17 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
  94.22 cents/kWh 100 h/ac   
RTP tariﬀ 13 26.00 cents/kWh 06 am – 05 pm €148 €80 p.a. 
  38.00 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
  18.00 cents/kWh 10 pm – 06 am   
  6.00 cents/kWh 100 h/ad   
 14 25.67 cents/kWh 06 am – 05 pm €148 €80 p.a. 
  37.95 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
  18.93 cents/kWh 10 pm – 06 am   
  6.72 cents/kWh 100 h/ad   
 15 26.00 cents/kWh 06 am – 05 pm 185%b €80 p.a. 
  38.00 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
  18.00 cents/kWh 10 pm – 06 am   
  6.00 cents/kWh 100 h/ad   
 16 25.67 cents/kWh 06 am – 05 pm 185%b €80 p.a. 
  37.95 cents/kWh 05 pm–10 pm   
  18.93 cents/kWh 10 pm – 06 am   
  6.72 cents/kWh 100 h/ad   
      
 
Turning to the moderating eﬀects, we find a significant tariﬀ type × NFC interaction eﬀect (F(3, 632) = 
5.799, p = .001). As Fig. 3 depicts, the eﬀect of tariﬀ type depends on whether participants are high or 
low in NFC. However, the moderation is somewhat diﬀerent from what we expected. Whereas low-
NFC individuals seem to generally perceive all tariﬀs as relatively high in price complexity, consumers 
high in NFC perceive the price complexity of the standard and TOU tariﬀ to be lower than the CPP and 
RTP tariﬀs. Hence, the eﬀect of tariﬀ type is stronger for high-NFC than for low-NFC individuals. The 
same post hoc test as before was performed separately for the high-NFC and low-NFC subsamples. In 
the case of low NFC, all tariﬀ types form one subset in which price complexity does not diﬀer 
significantly. In case of high NFC, we see two subsets (standard and TOU; CPP and RTP) for which price 
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complexity diﬀers across but not within. All other interaction terms involving NFC are not significant. 
Still, H4 is not supported. 
Table 3 
CONSUMPTION PATTERN   
ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION P.A. Kwh 
6 AM – 9 AM 900 
9 AM – 5 PM 600 
5 PM – 10 PM 1500 
10 PM – 6 AM 500 
TOTAL 3500 
 
Table 4 
Measurement.       
Construct Alpha IR CR AVE M SD 
       
Behavioral intentions (7-point semantic diﬀerential; adopted from Chandran and Morwitz, 2005) .92  .93 .76 3.81 1.28 
Me choosing the VoltStrom tariff is…       
unlikely / likely  .71     
improbable / probable  .87     
unsure / sure  .60     
impossible / possible  .85     
Perceived price complexity (7-point Likert scale; adapted from Homburg et al., 2014; Ittersum et al., 2010) .97  .97 .73 4.22 1.60 
With that many prices, I had a hard time understanding the VoltStrom tariff.  .74     
I would need to know a lot to understand the VoltStrom tariff.  .64     
The VoltStrom tariff looks very complicated to me.  .76     
It was difficult for me to obtain an overview of the price of the VoltStrom tariff.  .83     
It was tough to calculate the total price.  .77     
It was difficult for me to cope with the single numbers.  .74     
I concentrated a lot to carry out the many different calculations.  .57     
To determine the total costs, you need a calculator.  —a     
It was difficult to deal with the VoltStrom tariff.  .87     
I had to concentrate a lot to evaluate the VoltStrom tariff.  .66     
It took a lot of time to evaluate the VoltStrom tariff and to make a decision.  .68     
I had difficulties to keep an overview of the tariff.  .81     
Depth of information processing (7-point Likert scale; adapted from Novak and Hoﬀman, 2009; reverse coded) .89  .89 .67 4.40 1.40 
I relied on my sense of intuition while evaluating the VoltStrom tariff.  .72     
I trusted my hunches while evaluating the VoltStrom tariff.  .84     
I used my gut feelings while evaluating the VoltStrom tariff.  .81     
I went by what felt good to me.  —a     
I relied on my impressions while evaluating the VoltStrom tariff.  .65     
Perceived bill amount (slider reaching from €0 to €2400) n/a  n/a n/a 1115 110 
Given the consumption pattern, what would be the overall bill amount per year?  n/a     
Thought confidence (7-point semantic diﬀerential; adopted from Keller et al., 2002) .94  .94 .84 4.23 1.38 
How confident/ certain/sure are you that your first estimate is correct?       
not at all confident – completely confident  .81     
not at all certain – completely certain  .87     
not at all sure – completely sure  .84     
Need for cognition (7-point Likert scale adopted from Cotte and Wood, 2004; reverse coded) .81  .81 .52 4.76 1.43 
I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking 
abilities.  .42     
I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I’ll have to think in depth about something.  —a     
I only think as hard as I have to.  .40     
The idea of relying on thought to get my way to the top does not appeal to me.  .66     
The notion of thinking abstractly is not appealing to me.  .62     
Domain Specific Involvement (7-point Likert scale taken from Coulter et al., 2003) n/a  n/a n/a 2.87 1.77 
Electricity tariffs fascinate me.       
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Table 5 
Construct Correlation and Discriminant Validity 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
        
1 Need for cognition .695     
2 
Perceived price 
complexity −.450 .854    
3 Depth of information 
processing .214 −.395 .820   
4 Behavioral intentions .024 −.162 −.024 .870   
5 Thought confidence .223 −.487 .311 .325 .915 
6 Perceived costs −.075 .104 −.126 −.099 −.003 n/a 
 
 
Figure 2: Perceived Price Complexity across Tariﬀ Type. Note: Means marked by the same superscripts 
form homogenous subsets based on an R-E-G-W-F post hoc test, indicating that the mean diﬀerences 
are insignificant within, but significant across subsets (p < .05). 
Furthermore, albeit not hypothesized, we find a significant price ending × discount presentation 
format interaction (F(1, 632) = 4.253, p < .05), suggesting that the positive eﬀect of percent (vs. 
absolute) discount presentation format on price complexity appears in cases of even, but not odd 
price endings. The interaction is depicted in Fig. 4. All other two-way, three-way, and four-way 
interactions were not significant. 
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6. Discussion 
With the exception of H4, the data lend support to our rationale that the focal characteristics of 
dynamic tariﬀs lead to an increase in perceived price complexity. As Figs. 2 and 3 depict, the tariﬀ 
type plays a central role in the perception of price complexity. Specifically, we see that CPP and RTP 
are perceived more complex than the standard and TOU tariﬀs. We believe that this step-like eﬀect 
can be explained by the somewhat diﬀerent nature of the former tariﬀ subset, featuring price 
components that become eﬀective in peak-load times for which occurrence is hard to anticipate by 
consumers. This additional cognitive eﬀort then translates into a higher price complexity. 
Even though the nature of the tariﬀ type × NFC interaction is diﬀerent to what we hypothesized, it 
adds to our understanding of how diﬀerent consumer segments perceive dynamic tariﬀs. We 
expected that cognitive eﬀort-inducing variations in tariﬀ design would to a smaller extent translate 
into perceived price complexity for high-NFC consumers. Intriguingly, we observe that low-NFC 
consumers perceive high levels of price complexity for all tariﬀ types. This pattern allows for the 
Figure 3: Tariﬀ Type × NFC Interaction Eﬀect. Note: Means marked by the same 
superscripts form homogenous subsets based on an R-E-G-W-F post hoc test, 
indicating that the mean diﬀerences are insignificant within, but significant 
across subsets (p < .05). The tests are conducted separately for the respective 
low/high-NFC subsamples. 
 
Figure 4: Price Endings of Consumption-dependent Price Components × 
Discount Presentation Format Interaction. 
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interpretation that for low-NFC consumers, the introduction of the presumably more complex 
dynamic tariﬀs cannot make matters much more diﬃcult. This finding is consistent with consumers’ 
concerns expressed in focus group interviews that “tariﬀs may become even more complex than they 
currently are” (Darby and Pisica, 2013; p. 2329, italics added). 
The interaction of price endings of consumption-dependent price components and discount 
presentation format (Fig. 4) is unexpected. 
 Specifically, we observe only a diﬀerence in perceived price complexity due to a variation of price 
endings when the discount is framed as an absolute number, but not when it is framed as a 
percentage. A possible interpretation is that the presence of a percentage number is so salient and 
eﬀort-inducing that consumers do not more focus on price end-ings. In this way, this interaction 
speaks for the possibility of a ceiling eﬀect such that at some point, it requires a very substantial 
increase in cognitive eﬀort to further increase price complexity. This conclusion can also be drawn 
from Figs. 2 and 3. 
 
6.1. Analysis of consequences of perceived price complexity 
6.1.1. Findings 
To investigate the consequences of perceived price complexity we carried out a structural equation 
model (SEM) using AMOS 23. All fit indices were in line with the recommended cutoﬀ-values 
indicating good fit of the model with the data (χ2/df =2.658; GFI = .927; AGFI =.908; CFI = .975; 
RMSEA = .050). We report standardized path coeﬃcients. 
The results show that perceived price complexity has a negative impact on the depth of information 
processing (β = –.395, p < .001), supporting H5. As hypothesized in H6a and H6b, depth of 
information processing has a negative eﬀect on perceived bill amount (β = –.102, p < .05) and a 
positive eﬀect on thought confidence (β=.140, p < .001), respectively. The eﬀect of the perceived bill 
amount on behavioural intentions was negative and significant (β = –.089, p < .05), supporting H7. 
Furthermore, thought confidence has a positive eﬀect on behavioral intentions (β = .345, p < .001), 
supporting H8. 
We also assessed whether depth of information processing, perceived bill amount and thought 
confidence serve as partial or full mediators in the causal chain we propose. The direct eﬀect of 
perceived price complexity on perceived bill amount is insignificant (β = .062, p > .10), lending 
support for the key role of depth of information processing. However, perceived price complexity has 
a significant and negative direct eﬀect on thought confidence (β = –.432, p < .001), suggesting that 
depth of information processing partially mediates the perceived price complexity-thought 
confidence link. However, the direct path between perceived price complexity and behavioral 
intentions is not significant (β = –.049, p > .10). Last, we observe a negative and significant direct 
eﬀect of depth of information processing on behavioral intentions (β = –.162, p < .001), suggesting 
that the eﬀect of depth of information processing on behavioral intentions is partially mediated by 
perceived bill amount and thought confidence. Taken together, we conclude that depth of 
information processing, perceived bill amount, and thought confidence are the critical constructs 
linking perceived price complexity with behavioral intentions. The results of the SEM appear in Fig. 5. 
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6.1.2. Discussion 
Before discussing the results from our SEM, it is worth taking a step back and recapitulating the early 
point we made regarding the unique context of decision-making for consumers when choosing 
between energy tariﬀs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To motivate the examination of depth of information processing, we argued that, albeit highly 
relevant for everyone, the focal category evokes only very little consumer involvement. 
Consequently, we expected that despite the substantial monetary sacrifice (€962), many consumers 
would lack the motivation to engage in systematic processing once the level of perceived price 
complexity increases. To support this reasoning, we included a single-item scale for domain-specific 
consumer involvement in our questionnaire (“Electricity tariﬀs fascinate me”). On a scale anchored 1 
(not at all) to 7 (very much so) the mean in our representative sample was 2.87 (SD = 1.77) and the 
median was even lower (2.0). This finding reinforces the challenge energy providers and 
policymakers face when promoting dynamic tariﬀs in Europe. In this context, depth of information 
processing, perceived bill amount and thought confidence play important roles in the consumers’ 
tariﬀ evaluation process. As the SEM reveals, our hypotheses are supported. The perception of price 
complexity first and foremost leads to a decrease in depth of information processing, that is, the 
likelihood with which consumers apply heuristic processing increases. A so reduced depth of 
information processing has a twofold eﬀect: the perceived bill amount increases and the thought 
confidence decreases, both resulting in lower behavioral intentions. It is also worth noting that 
across all tariﬀs, consumers overestimate the annual bill amount (M = €1.115, SD = €110) by about 
€150 or 15.9% on average. This is interesting because seminal research on price partitioning suggests 
the application of an anchoring heuristic in which the connection charge is used as an anchor that is 
only insuﬃciently upward adjusted for the other price components (Morwitz et al., 1998). It could be 
that in the realm of dynamic tariﬀs, the connection charge is not perceived as a base price because it 
contributes relatively little to the final bill amount and hence other price components may be more 
salient. 
The SEM also reveals that the direct path between perceived price complexity and behavioral 
intentions is not significant, suggesting that the eﬀect is fully mediated by the proposed three 
mediators. At closer examination of the proposed causal chain, however, we find that the 
unhypothesized relations between perceived price complexity and thought confidence and between 
depth of information processing and behavioral intentions are both negative and significant. 
Concerning the former, perceived price complexity apparently decreases thought confidence by a 
Figure 5 Structural Results of Consequences of Perceived Price 
Complexity. p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; ns = not significant 
 
Postprint of article “Perceived price complexity of dynamic energy tariffs: An investigation of 
antecedents and consequences” in Energy policy, 106, 244-254. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2017.02.051  
 
18 
 
mechanism other than depth of information processing that is not included in our model. It is 
possible that consumers who experience price complexity fear being “nickel-and-dimed” by the tariﬀ 
provider and thus lose faith in their evaluation (Carlson and Weathers, 2008, p. 725). It is also 
possible that the prospect of behavior change to reduce the bill amount has such an eﬀect, an aspect 
that is not the focus of our research. Concerning the latter, one could speculate that a higher depth 
of information processing increases consumers’ awareness for the overall cost of electricity per year. 
Furthermore, higher depth of information processing may increase consumers’ cost of thinking 
(Shugan, 1980) which may decrease behavioral intention by a reduced price fairness (Feurer et al., 
2015). Clearly, more research is necessary to understand this relationship. Apart from the data 
suggesting partial mediations in two cases, the eﬀect of price complexity on perceived bill amount is 
fully mediated by depth of information processing. 
 
7. Conclusion and policy implications 
7.1. Contributions 
In many countries across the globe, decarbonization eﬀorts are getting oﬀ the ground and the share 
of fluctuating, renewable-based electricity generation is increasing significantly. However, shifts from 
nuclear and fossil energy sources to renewables bear the challenge of a better alignment of energy 
production and consumption. Some re-searchers highlight the fact that dynamic tariﬀs are an 
important piece in the puzzle, but residential consumers show adverse reactions to their inherent 
price complexity (e.g., Breukers and Mourik, 2013; Dütschke and Paetz, 2013). In Europe, these tariﬀs 
are oﬀered as opt-in options only, and their success ultimately depends on consumers selecting 
them. 
In response, the overarching goal of this study was to better understand how consumers’ 
perceptions of price complexity are formed and by which processes price complexity in turn shapes 
behavioral intentions to select a dynamic tariﬀ. Using a large and representative sample of German 
consumers, our research identifies tariﬀ type, price endings of the consumption-dependent price 
components and the discount presentation format as well as NFC as important drivers of perceived 
price complexity. Depth of information processing and perceived bill amount and thought confidence 
are important variables that mediate the eﬀect of perceived price complexity on behavioral 
intentions. 
In revealing these relationships, our research provides several contributions. First, our research 
bridges literature streams from several disciplines and demonstrates how an interdisciplinary 
approach can provide valuable insights into dynamic tariﬀ-choice behavior. In so doing, we 
contribute to the growing literature on consumer reactions to dynamic tariﬀs in the realm of DSM 
(e.g., Dupont et al., 2014; Grünewald et al., 2015; Salies, 2013). Specifically, by illuminating the 
decision-making process, we add to the young literature stream that specifically adopts a consumer 
perspective (e.g., Darby and Pisica, 2013; Dupont et al., 2014; Dütschke and Paetz, 2013; Stenner et 
al., 2015). While this research acknowledges that a tariﬀ should be simple, “most of the evidence 
comes from focus groups, attitudinal survey and pilots” (Quillinan, 2011, p. 547). With our study, we 
illuminate how price complexity and cognitive burden aﬀect the decision-making process. 
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Second, we advance the literature on price complexity (e.g., Homburg et al., 2014; Feurer et al., 
2015) that is still in its infancy, and on price partitioning (Carlin, 2009; Greenleaf et al., 2016; Morwitz 
et al., 1998). For example, while Greenleaf et al. (2016) acknowledge that pricing schemes “have 
become more complex and sophisticated, often making [the price] more diﬃcult for consumers to 
accurately process” (p. 107), traditional price partitioning research focuses on simple base-price-and-
surcharge situations. Specifically, our research adds to the price complexity and price partitioning 
literature by examining the special context of dynamic energy tariﬀs in which prices are highly 
complex, and the salience of the base price (i.e., connection charge) and of consumer involvement is 
low. In doing so, we also add to the literature that examines behavioral eﬀects of complex tariﬀ 
structures (e.g., Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006). 
 
7.2. Limitations 
We acknowledge that our research has several limitations that provide avenues for further research. 
First, our unit of analysis is the individual consumer. While it is possible that in many households the 
decision for an energy tariﬀ is made by one single individual, prior research assumes a joint decision-
making process in many cases (Gottwalt et al., 2011; Wilson and Dowladabadi, 2007). Future 
research should consider a joint decision-making process and illuminate how this process is aﬀected 
by diﬀerences in family role structure and diﬀerent decision strategies (Ashraf, 2009; Davis, 1976). 
Second, this study is limited by several issues that arise from the nature of our experimental design 
and procedure. As it is extremely diﬃcult in Europe to observe actual electricity tariﬀ choice behavior 
in the realm of a field experiment, we relied on a scenario experiment with behavioral intentions 
rather than actualized behavior as a dependent variable. As such, participants stated preferences in 
an artificial tariﬀ choice situation. In real life, consumers might be willing to invest more cognitive 
eﬀort in the evaluation of a dynamic tariﬀ. 
 
7.3. Implications 
The results of our empirical study yield several implications. First and foremost, policymakers and 
managers of power suppliers need to understand that the requirement to oﬀer dynamic pricing as 
opt-in options has upgraded residential consumers and their perceptions of price complexity to be 
critical factors. If consumers cannot be convinced to select these tariﬀs, their potential to contribute 
to successful decarbonization is likely to be untapped. 
To overcome the challenges of perceived price complexity, policy-makers could rethink the opt-in 
rule and incentivize the introduction of dynamic tariﬀs as a standard tariﬀ. Alternatively, managers 
must design very attractive dynamic tariﬀs that compensate consumers for the inherent complexity. 
In our view, it must be feared that the needed flexibilization of residential electricity demand may be 
unrealistic in the current opt-in policy framework. Even a relatively simple two-stage TOU tariﬀ may 
not overcome the challenges in the future electricity system with high shares of volatile electricity 
generation. In this light, locally operating aggregators as emerging market players, may have an 
advantage in that they can better utilize individual flexibilities by achieving a high degree of 
Postprint of article “Perceived price complexity of dynamic energy tariffs: An investigation of 
antecedents and consequences” in Energy policy, 106, 244-254. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2017.02.051  
 
20 
 
automatization that is often unnoticed by consumers (e.g., by postponing the charging of electric 
vehicles during the night). If this potential can be tapped, relatively simple tariﬀs may be used. 
Taken together, all market players need to be aware that tariﬀ design is no longer only a means to 
the end of price discrimination to maximize profits in the light of heterogeneous demand. Rather, 
tariﬀ design may contribute substantially to system stability. From a policy standpoint, dynamic 
tariﬀs are attractive in that they contribute to grid stability in a relatively timely and cost eﬀective 
manner (compared to the expansion of the grid itself) and should thus be held in high regard. Hence, 
system stability, not profitability, should be prioritized. 
Our research also helps in understanding the psychological pro-cesses by which consumers perceive 
and react to the complexity dynamic tariﬀs imply. When designing dynamic tariﬀs, managers should 
first and foremost try to limit perceived price complexity for consumers in ways possible, for 
instance, by oﬀering absolute dis-counts and even price endings where possible. Given the increased 
level of perceived price complexity for tariﬀs that feature price components that become eﬀective in 
peak-load times, special caution is required. At the same time, if such a tariﬀ is to be oﬀered, the 
non-linear increase in complexity provides some room for even more complex tariﬀs because the 
objective increase in complexity does not lead consumers to perceive price complexity over and 
above the extent they already do. 
Second, tariﬀ design should take into account the special role of NFC. Diﬀerent tariﬀs should be 
oﬀered and communicated such that they meet the tastes of high- and low-NFC consumers, 
respectively. Simple TOU tariﬀs with two consumption-dependent price components could be 
targeted at high-NFC consumers specifically as they are not perceived as more complex than the 
standard tariﬀ. For those consumers lacking the motivation to process at higher levels of price 
complexity, two alternatives seem feasible. First, measures could be taken to reduce the cognitive 
burden (e.g., oﬀering a function on the website that calculates the total bill amount) or to increase 
consumer involvement and ultimately cognitive motivation (e.g., gamification). Finally, it may be 
possible to target CPP and RTP tariﬀs at low-NFC consumers, utilizing the fact that they perceive all 
electricity tariﬀs as rather complex in any case. 
 
7.4. Further research 
Even though our experimental approach is quasi-standard in marketing research (Bemmaor, 1995), it 
would be desirable for future research to validate our results by observing real tariﬀ choice behavior. 
Furthermore, to design a valid manipulation, it was necessary to provide participants with an artificial 
consumption pattern. However, due to low involvement, consumers may in reality not know about 
their consumption or may find it diﬃcult to predict their (future) consumption given a particular tariﬀ 
(Goodman and Irmak, 2013; Nunes, 2000). Future research should investigate the role this diﬃculty 
plays for the evaluation of dynamic tariﬀs. Furthermore, analyzing other forms to incentivize 
consumers, such as normative drivers or alternative approaches attaching game-like attributes to 
demand response measures, might be further fields of investigation. 
More work also needs to be done to understand which factors lead consumers to overestimate or 
underestimate the total cost of electricity tariﬀs. Our research suggests that consumers frequently 
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apply heuristics when evaluating dynamic tariﬀs but does not illuminate which heuristics were 
applied. 
 
Last, as always, future research needs to ensure generalizability by replicating and extending our 
findings with diﬀerent samples and diﬀerently designed dynamic tariﬀs. 
Appendix A. Supporting information 
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the online version at 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.02.051 
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